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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CHEVRON OIL COMP ANY, doing business 
as STANDARD OIL COMP ANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative corporation 
of the State of Utah, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMP ANY, a 
Delaware corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative corporation 
of the State of Utah, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11,317 
Case No. 
11,318 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellants petition the Court to vacate its decision 
[lncl grant a rehearing. The motion is based on the fol-
lowing grounds: 
1. 'l1he Court erred in holding that the zoning re-
striction, which admittedly prevents any economic use 
rif tlw plaintiffs' property, does not violate the Constitu-
tions of Utah or the United States. The Court overlooked 
tli<> nncontrm-erted fact that the character of the prop-
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erty was radically changed by the constrnction of the 
freeway and the interchange at Pine Creek Hill. This 
interchange converted the property from grazing land 
into highway service property. 
2. The Court erred in holding that the restriction 
of appellants' property to grazing purposes promotes 
the public welfare. The uncontradicted evidence estab-
lishes that the restriction is affirmatively detrimental to 
the public welfare. 
3. The Court erred in deciding that the plaintiffR' 
proposed operations at Pinr Creek Hill would deprive 
existing establishments in the 'l'own of Beaver of the 
freeway-generated business. The physical facts are that 
these existing establishments are a half mile or more 
away from the freeway and traffic must leave the free-
way and detour to reach them. It is a matter of common 
knowledge and the evidence is clear that the great bulk 
of freeway traffic will not make this detour and will 
not reach the established outlets in the Town of Beaver. 
4. The Court erred in holding that the decision of 
the zoning authority that the restriction of the plain· 
tiffs' property to grazing use promotes the public wel-
fare, is conclusive. Whether the restriction promotes the 
public welfare is a question of law for the Court to 
decide. 
5. The Court erred in holding that plaintiffs are 
in effect estopped to question the constitutionality of the 
ordinance because they acquired the property after the 
ordinance was passed. The fallacy in this decision is that 
the freeway converted the property in question from 
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grazing land into highway service land. The interchange 
at Pine Creek Hill was designed and established for 
the V(>ry purpose of making the property now owned by 
the plaintiffs a location where freeway motorists could 
obtain needed supplies and services without leaving the 
freeway. 
G. The statement in the decision that the plaintiffs 
acquired the property in the hope of converting it into 
highway service property is wholly unwarranted and 
incorrect. The property had been converted into high-
\\ ay service property long before any of the plaintiffs 
arqnired any interest in it. 
7. 'l'he Court's comment that plaintiffs purchased 
tht> property for a nominal snm with the intention of 
disposing of it at a handsome profit is likewise without 
nny foundation in the record or in fact. The fact is 
that the plaintiffs paid the full value of the property 
for highway service purposes and never had any inten-
tion of using it for any other purpose. 
8. The Court has failed to give any eff oot to Rule 
fi'.: and its decision is in conflict with its prior decisions. 
ARGUMENT 
'i'he Court holds that a zoning restriction upon the 
ll:se of the property if valid when encated remains valid 
tlwreafter and immune from any constitutional attack 
llotwithstanding a radical change in the character of 
tlw l1rop0rty has taken place since the ordinance was 
adoptPd. We submit that the Court erred and we urgently 
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request that the proposition be reconsidered and rejected. 
It is contrary to law, as declared by every appellate 
court that has considered it. 
The correct principle is applied in Ford vs. The 
City of Miami Beach, 1 So.2d 642, where the facts were 
exactly analogous to those in the case at bar. The prop-
erty involved in the cited case consisted of vacant lot~ 
abutting on the ocean and having a depth of approxi-
mately 270 feet at the time the zoning ordinance was 
adopted. The lots were properly zoned residential. Some 
years later the back part of the lots was washed away 
by natural forces, reducing the lots to the depth of 60 
or 70 feet, rendering them unsuited to residential pur-
poses. The plaintiffs purchased the lots after the change 
had occurred and while the lots were still zoned residen-
tial. They applied to the City to have the property re-
zoned to permit the construction and operation of a 
hotel. The City refused to amend the ordinance and the 
plaintiff brought suit to have it adjudged to be unconsti-
tutional and invalid. The trial court upheld the action 
of the City, refusing to am(~nd the ordinance. '11he plain-
tiffs appealed and the Supreme Court of Florida re-
versed the judgment of the trial court. It held that th~ 
restriction of the lots to residential purposes confiscatrd 
the property in violation of the Constitution. The opin-
ion stated: 
"Restrictions on private property must he kept 
within the limifa of necessity for the pnhlic wel 
fare or it will be recognized as an unlawful taking. 
Averne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 22~. 
15 N.E.2d 587, 117 A.L.R. 1110. And when vrop-
erty, restricted to a dt>fined nse by a zoning ordi-
nance, changes its physical character from natural 
causes to the extent that it is no longer adaptable 
to the use it is zoned for, then it becomes the 
duty of the zoning board to relax its restrictions 
to prevent confiscation just as much so as in the 
case where the regulation was invalid in the first 
instance. See State ex rel. Tavlor v. Jacksonville . ' supra; Ex parte Wise, 141 Fla. 222, 192 So. 872." 
The correct proposition is thus declared in Stevens 
1. Toirn of Huntington, 229 N.E.2d 591, as follows: 
"Situated as the property is, adjacent to a large 
shopping area, it can hardly be said that the land 
is reasonably adapted to residential use. This 
does not mean, of course, that it is impossible to 
use the property as a residence. It has, in fact, 
been so used since 1950. But, in the intervening 
years, the character of the surrounding area has 
changed so radically that it is unreasonable to 
dE~mand that the property be continued for use as 
a residence onlv. The burdens of traffic on Route 
110, the noise, ~nd the stores in the area, all con-
tribute to making the property unsuitable for 
residential use - a fact amply established by the 
evidence." 
'rlw lt·ading case on this point is Arverne Bay 
Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587, 117 
A.L.R. 1110, cited in our opening brief. This is an excep-
tionally well reasoned decision by a very able Court. 
It has hem followed and approved by practically every 
appr•llate. court and, insofar as we can determine, has 
never be0n critieizPd. An examination of the cases cited 
in Nlu·pherd's Citation will disclose that this decision is 
a landmark in zoning law. It is squarely in point, and 
\\ (' nro·p its careful consideration. 
b 
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This Court's decision that the plaintiffs are not de. 
prived of their property because tlH'Y bought grazing 
land and still own grazing land is unrealistic and unwar. 
ranted. That the restriction of the plaintiffs' property 
to grazing purposes prevents them from making any 
economic or beneficial nse of the property is conclusively 
established. At no stage of this proceeding have thr, 
defendants or any of them denied this fact. If preventing 
a property owner from making any beneficial use of his 
property does not deprive him of that property, it is 
difficult to conceive of anything that would effe0t such 
a result. ·what value does property have if it cannot 
be put to any beneficial use 1 According to this Court, 
plaintiffs are not deprived of their property because they 
are still permitted to pay taxes on it. Such a conclusion 
finds not support in reason or in law. 
It is a misconception of the situation to say that 
the plaintiffs purchased grazing land and that they still 
own grazing land. What the plaintiffs purchased and 
what they now own is highway service property, a very 
valuable commercial site. The restriction completely de-
stroys this value and it clearly deprives the plaintiffs of 
their property without due process of law. 
Suppose that the livestock man who owned the prop-
erty originally had brought suit to have the ordinance 
declared invalid upon the same ground that plaintiffs 
rely on. Would any court uphold the zoning restriction 
in face of the fact that the character of the property 
has been completely changed by the freeway interchange! 
The answer is obvious. The plaintiffs have, of course, 
.. 
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succeeded to all of their grantor's rights in the property 
and that includes the rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. 
1'he charge made by this Court that the plaintiffs 
imrchased the property for a nominal sum with the idea 
of realizing a handsome profit is completely unwarranted 
aHd incorrect. This is not a fact and nothing in the 
record sustains it. It was orally stipulated at the pre-
trial that Chevron Oil Company paid $50,000 for its 
parcel, which is many times its value as grazing land. 
'l'he implication drawn by the Court that the plaintiffs 
are s11eculators and should be in effect estopped from 
rlaiming that the ordinance confiscates the property is 
without any basis in fact or in law. 
ln Forbes vs. Hubbard, 180 N.E. 767, a similar 
charge was made. 
"Counsel for appellants argue that this suit is but 
an attempt on the part of appellee to destroy the 
zoning ordinance of the village for his personal 
benefit; that he purchased the property after the 
zoning ordinance was passed, and is gambling on 
the possibility of making a large profit on it if the 
zoning ordinance can be destroyed. The evidence 
shows that appellee paid $350 per front foot for 
this property, which is seven times the highest 
value placed on the lot as residence property." 
• • • • 
"Whether appellee loses or gains by the outcome 
of this lawsuit is a matter about which we can 
have no concern. No moral turpitude, as seems 
to be urged by counsel for appellants, is perceived, 
however, in appellee's taking upon himse~f, by 
his purchase and suit, the burden and clann of 
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r:moving :vhat he alleges to be an illegal restric. 
hon. Motives of self-interest are most conunon 
in lawsuits, but snch motives have never been, and 
cannot be held to be a sufficient reason for with. 
holding relief to which parties show themselw~ 
entitled. It is conceded that the invasion of ap1wJ. 
lee's property is serious and highly injurious. Ir 
such invasion bears a substantial relation to the 
public good, he must, as this court has many times 
said, bear the burden. lf, however, that restric-
tion lacks the necessary basis of public good it 
comes within the constitutional inhibition against 
taking private property for the public use without 
compensation. 
"(3, 4) Counsel for appdlants argue that as av· 
pellee purchased this property after the passage 
of the zoning ordinance he should not now be 
heard to complain that that ordinance is invalid. 
We know of no rule of law that creates an estoppel 
against attack by such purchaser on the validity 
of a zoning ordinance nnless there bl' in his acts 
or the acts of his grantor that which of them-
selves would estop him." 
In Trust Company vs. City of Chicago, 96 N.E.2d 
499, the Court said : 
"This does not mean, however, that a purchaser 
of property upon which a restriction had previ-
ously been imposed by a zoning ordinance may not 
attack the validity of such restriction. Forbes '" 
Hubbard, 348, Ill.' 166, 180 N.E. 767. Neither su~h 
purchase nor the fact that the purchase~· .or !11S 
grantor may have acquiesced in such classif1c~ti.on 
will estop the purchaser from testing the validity 
of the ordinance, since this court is committed_ to 
the doctrine that mere acquiescence, irrespcctivP 
of the length thereof, cannot legalize the e!Par 
usurpation of power which off ends against the 
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basic law. Harmon v. City of Peoria, 373 Ill. 594, 
27 N.E.2d 525; Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 16G, 
18? ~.E. 767. Zoning ordinances, whether they be 
origmal or amendatory legislation, and regard-
less of how long or by whom they have been 
recognized as legal, cannot be sustain~d if in viola-
tion of the constitution." 
'['he argmnent that plaintiffs are not deprived of 
their proverty he<'anse tlH'Y purchased it after the ordi-
1ia11ee was adopted a11d can still use it for grazing pur-
po:-:Ps is entirel)' spPcious. In a yery real sense, the 
n•striction is a continuing, unla\vful burden which fol-
lows the property nntil it is removed. Suppose the 
County had unlawfully constructed a wall around the 
i;t·orwrty which i)revented any access to it except for 
goats. \Vould the Court say that the owner of the prop-
Prty could not assert that he had been deprived of his 
property because he purchased it after the wall was built 
and could still use it for grazing purposes~ To answer 
tlwse qtwstions in the affirmative would mean that con-
iotitntional guaranties are operative only at intervals and 
dependPnt npon the time when the owner acquires his 
title. No authority can be found for such an interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. 
'l'his Court's reliance upon Dowse vs. Salt Lake City 
is misplaced. Each zoning case must rest upon its own 
facts and snnounding circumstances. This is so because 
the validity of the ordinance depends upon the character 
of the property involved and the impact of the ordinance 
lllJOn thP public welfare. The facts and circumstances in 
tlw Dow::;e case are so radically different from those in 
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the case at bar that it cannot be regarded as persuasive 
authority. 
The right to acquire and use propert)' for a lawful 
purpose is an inherent right and existed prior to any 
constitutional enactment. The latter merely guaranteE>s 
the integrity of the right. It is not within the power of 
the state or any subdivision thereof to deprive an owner 
of all beneficial use of his property without just compen-
sation, regardless of the public welfare or m•ed. 
THE RES'rRICTTON ON PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY 
DOES NOT PRO:MOTE THE PUBLIC WELFARE 
The Court's conclusion that the restriction against 
the plaintiffs' property is detrimental to the public wel-
fare because it would intercept business which would 
otherwise go to established enterprises in the Town of 
Beaver, thus putting the latter ont of business, is with-
out support in the record. The evidence is overwhelming 
that interstate freeway traffic cannot he lured or forced 
into the citiPs or towns to obtain the necessary supplies 
and services. All of the established businesses in the Town 
of Beaver are located a half mile away from the freeway, 
and the onlv freeway traffic which will reach them after 
the freeway is opened is the traffic which is destined to 
the Town. The only hope of protecting the established 
businesses in the 'rown of Btiaver after the freeway is 
opened lies in inducing new <>ntt·rprises to locate in the 
'L'O\Yll. 
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No one can deny the need of some commercial de-
w lopmen t in Beaver County. The plaintiffs' proposed 
11roject will not only capture freeway-oriented business 
bnt it will provide employment for several families, most 
of whom ·will reside in the Town of Beaver. The tax base 
will be definitely increased. These various substantial 
benPfits will be available without any appreciable cost 
whatever to the County. The claim that the County will 
he required to furnish fire protection and police protec-
tion is purely fanciful. The County has no fire equip-
rnent and there is no water in the vicinity of Pine Creek 
Hill which could be used to extinguish fires. The plain-
tiffs will be required to furnish all utilities and fire 
protection. If at any time school children need to be 
tram;ported, the State and not the County will bear the 
rxpense. The suggestion that the burdens of govern-
rnen outweigh the benefits to be derived from the develop-
rnnt at Pine Creek Hill is a pure fiction. 
It is error to ignore the rights of the freeway traveler 
to obtain his services and supplies without leaving the 
free~way. It is likewise error to ignore the safety and 
convenience of these travelers, which is definitely in-
volved if adequate freeway-oriented services and sup-
plips are not available. When the uncontradicted evi-
dence and the physical facts and surrounding circum-
::>tances are considered, the question whether the restric-
tion promotes the public welfare is one of law and is 
not open to honest debate of the facts. The Zoning Com-
mist:>ion and the Board of County Commissioners deter-
mined that the public welfare required that property 
along the freeway located several miles from established 
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commnniti<>s should h<' allocat<>d to highway servi('e 
zones. Such an allocation was a necPssar:> and important 
llart of tlw zoning plan and was a determination that 
public welfare demanded it. By classifying the property 
as grazing property, the Board nullified the zoning plan 
which it adopkd. 
At tlw oral argument, respondents reliPd upon the 
opinion of their alleged planning expert to support the 
contention that tht• question whether the restriction upon 
the use of the plaintiffs' pro1wrty is necessary to pro-
mote the public welfare is honestly (lebatable. However, 
the law is well settk•d that tlw question whether a restric, 
tion upon property promotes the pnblic welfare is a 
mixed question of law and fact and if the physical facts 
and surrounding circumstances demonstrate that the re-
striction \\·ill not produc~· any public benefits, it is un-
reasonahh• and arhitrary, notwithstanding expert opinion 
to tlw contrar>·· In the case of Tulsa vs. 81.wnson, 3GG 
1'.2d G29, the proposition is clearly stated as follows: 
"Bv unmistakahle tPnor of the argmrwnt we are 
urg;cd by the cit>· to, in pffect, place its kgislatiw 
powers beyond the scope of judicial l'P\-it•w \Yhen-
ever the matter appears 'fairly <lebatahlc.' But 
this, as was stated in tlH' Barclay case, must dr-
pend npon the physical facts disclosed in each 
particular cast'. \Ve must lw evPr mindful that, 
inasmuch as tlw inPvitahlP pff pct of ordinances, 
such as the on<> hen· involvPCl, is to limit private 
ri<rhts in the inten•::-;t of imhlic welfare, the exN-ci~P of the municipal powN mnst lw earefnlly 
guardPd and be pl:'nnith·d only wh(•n thP cond1-
tio11s and eircumstai1cct-: as shuwn diselose a need 
for the proper cxereist' of thP polieP powN: Ok!a-
horna City v. Barclay, snpra. An a(~adPllliC op1n-
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ion of a professional city planner as to the desir-
ability of a particular restriction to serve as a 
'buffer of lessPr than normal commercial inten-
sity,' will not, when contradicted by controlling 
physical facts, ,jnstif\ this court in holding as a 
matter of law that the question here presented is 
'fairly debatable' and precludes judicial interfer-
ence with the municipal determination of neces-
sity for the particnlar restriction placed." 
'To the sarnP eff Pct are the following authorities: 
Hamer 1·s. Thr Town of Ross, 382 P.2d 375; Davis vs. 
City of Hockford, 208 N.E.2d 110; lV olfe vs. Village of 
Hirl'rsid<', 208 N.E.2d 833. 
Evt~n the defendants' expert planner who designed 
tlH' lH'PSPnt ordinance did not express an unqualified 
o]linion on tlH~ public necessity for restricting the use 
of the- plaintiffs' pro1wrty. His testimony was that there 
was no }ll'esent need for highway service facilities at 
I'im· Creek Hill and that the established facilities in the 
Town of Beaver could adt>quately supply the needs of 
thP frt>eway traffic. Obviously, he had in mind present 
conditions and circumstances, particularly that the free-
way was not then opt>n and did not by-pass the Town 
of Beaver. He further testified that he inserted the 
higfovay servicP zone in the ordinance because he fore-
saw the time when it would be necessary to allocate prop-
erty abutting the freeway to the highway service zone 
in order to meet the public demand. In other words, he 
regarded the classification of the plaintiffs' property 
as grazing to be temporary classification and that when 
tlw freeway was 01wned and the Town of Beaver by-
riassed, there would be a need to reclassify the property 
ill the highway service zone. 
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Even if the clef enclants' expert had expressed the 
unqualified opinion that the restriction was necessary to 
promote the public welfan', such an opinion is completely 
discounted by the physical facts and surrounding cir-
cmnstances which demonstrate beyond any honest de-
bate that the restriction upon the use of plaintiffs' 
property does not produce any public benefit of any 
kind or character, but on the contrary, blockades the 
much needed commercial development of the County and 
deprives the County of an expense-free tax base increase 
and the public generally of a much needed freeway-ori-
ented service. The clear fact is that this restriction bt>ne-
fits no onP hut does positive ham1 to a g;reat man~v people. 
THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM JS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY ANY FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND SHOULD BE YACATED AND SET ASIDE 
The opinion states that this is an <>qnitabl0 vrocPed-
ing and that thP Comi ma:-· review the findings of fact, 
bnt should not disturb them unkss they are clearly 
against tlw weight of the Pvidence. The opinion is in 
error in treating the decision of the trial court as con-
taining any findings of fact. The determinations made 
in the trial court's decision are pure conclusions of law. 
No findings of fact wen~ ev0r made and none of the 
iss11Ps other than issues of law were ever determined. 
Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is a per-
emptory command to every trial court to find the facts 
specially and state Heparately its conclusion of law in 
<'Ven· case wlH'r0 tlwre is no jury. It is only by obeying 
this .command that this Court can dt>tPrrninP what the 
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lower court actually decided and whether the judicial 
mind ever resolved the actual controversy existing be-
hn~en the parties. 
The decision of this Court repeals Rule 52 of the 
Rnles of Civil Procedure and overrules at least two 
prior decisions of this Court which decide that parties 
are entitled to a decision of their controversies, rather 
tlian a summary brush-off as was done by the trial 
court in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the opinion rendered in 
this case is based upon a misconception of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the ordi-
nance restricting the use of the property involved; that 
the character of the property has been radically changed 
h? the construction of the interchange and the Interstate 
I1'reeway, so that the restriction confiscates the property 
liy preventing any beneficial use thereof, in violation of 
the Constitution; that even if the restriction was valid 
when enacted, it has since become invalid and it was the 
duty of the Board of County Commissioners to rezone 
the property and their refusal to do so is arbitrary, 
unreasonable and discriminatory; that as a matter of 
law, the restriction produces no public welfare. 
The decision of this Court that the question of 
whether the restriction promotes the public welfare is 
honestly debatable, is based upon the erroneous assump-
tion that the freeway-oriented business which would be 
intercepted at Pine Creek Hill by plaintiffs' proposed 
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operations would find its \my to tlw cstahlishPd husinrs' 
enterprises in the Town of Brnwr. 
Then• is little doubt but that the establishPd busi-
nesses in the Town of BPaYCr will suffer suhstantially 
when the frePway is opened and hy-passPs the 'rown of 
Bea\·er. This business depression will occur, n•gardlPs8 
of wlwther plaintiffs' property at Pim• Cn·Pk Hill is <le-
veloped as lffOposed by tlH' Tllaintiff s or wlwther it is 
allowed to remain idle. 
The }Jr<'Sent d('Cision will have far-reaching effrcts 
upon tlw economy of Bt•aver County and the safety and 
convenience of a large sector of the traveling public. We 
nrgPntly request that it he \·acated and the important 
questions involwd reconsidered and a decision rendered 
in accordance with the facts and thP law. 
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